Information theory provides a mathematical foundation to measure uncertainty in belief. Belief is represented by a probability distribution that captures our understanding of an outcome's plausibility. Information measures based on Shannon's concept of entropy include realization information, Kullback-Leibler divergence, Lindley's information in experiment, cross entropy, and mutual information.
Introduction
This work integrates essential properties of information embedded within Shannon's derivation of entropy [1] and the Bayesian perspective, which identifies probability with plausibility. We pursue this investigation in order to understand how to rigorously apply information-theoretic concepts to the theory of inference and machine learning. Specifically, we would like to understand how to quantify the evolution of predictions given by machine learning models.
We begin in 1.1 with a thought experiment that illustrates shortcomings with the way standard information measures would partition prediction information and residual information during machine learning training.
Shortcomings with standard approaches
We would like to partition label information in training data into a component that is predicted by a machine learning model and the residual component that remains unpredicted. Ideally, the sum of these two components would be a conserved quantity, which would allow us to view training as simply shifting information from the residual partition to the predicted partition. More importantly, however, predictive information should clearly capture prediction quality.
Let q 0 (x) be a probability distribution that represents uninformed predictions regarding labels of interest, such as uniform probability over all outcomes. Let q 1 (x) represent prediction probabilities from arXiv:1911.09559v1 [cs.IT] 21 Nov 2019 a suitably trained machine learning model. Finally, we represent training labels as r(x), which assigns full probability to specified outcomes. See 2.3 and 2.4 for additional details regarding notation. Two approaches to measuring predictive and residual information that are related to entropy would use either the Kullback-Leibler divergence [2, 3] or Lindley's information in experiment [4] .
Kullback-Leibler.
Prediction information: dx q 1 (x) log q 1 (x) q 0 (x) Residual information: dx r(x) log r(x) q 1 (x) 2. Lindley.
Prediction information: dx q 1 (x) log 1 q 1 (x) − dx q 0 (x) log 1 q 0 (x)
Residual information: dx r(x) log 1 r(x) − dx q 1 (x) log 1
Now suppose we learn that all of the training data had been mislabeled so that predictions q 1 (x) are worthless. We replace r(x) above with corrected labelsr(x) and examine how these measurements change. Using KL-divergence, the prediction information remains unchanged and residual information explodes, which highlights how total information is not conserved; variations in intermediate belief q 1 (x) can dramatically alter the sum. More problematic, however, is the fact that prediction information is indifferent to prediction quality.
The Lindley formulation is substantially less satisfying. Although total information is conserved, neither prediction information nor residual information changes, thus leaving no indication that the model is catastrophically mistrained.
Our contributions
In the course of pursuing a consistent framework in which information measurements may be understood, we have derived a theory of information from first principles that places all entropic information measures in a unified interpretable context. By specifying the properties of information we desire, we show how a unique formulation follows that subsumes critical properties of Shannon's construction of entropy.
This theory fundamentally understands entropic information as a form of expectation that measures changes in belief. Expectation is not necessarily taken with respect to the distributions that represent the shift in belief, but rather with respect to another distribution representing a point of view. As a consequence, information associated with a change in belief is not a fixed quantity. Just as rational belief must evolve as new evidence becomes available, so also does the information we would rationally assign to previous shifts in belief. By emphasizing the role of rational belief, this theory recognizes that the degree of validity we assign to past states of belief is both dynamic and potentially subjective as our state of knowledge matures. We find compelling foundations for this perspective within the Bayesian philosophy of probability as a logic for expressing and updating uncertainty [5, 6] .
As a consequence of enforcing consistency with rational belief, a second additivity property emerges; just as entropy can be summed over independent distributions, information gained over a sequence of observations can be summed over intermediate belief updates. Total information over such a sequence is independent of how results are grouped or ordered. This provides a compelling solution to the thought experiment above. Label information in training data is a conserved quantity and we motivate a formulation of prediction information that is directly tied to prediction quality. Notably, predictive information trained with incorrect labels above would become negative in the view of corrected labelsr(x) using this theory. We experimentally observe this phenomenon in 7.2.
Soofi, Ebrahimi, and others [7] [8] [9] [10] identify key contributions to information theory in the decade following Shannon's paper that are intrinsically tied to entropy. These are the Kullback-Leibler divergence, Lindley's information in experiment, and Jaynes' construction of entropy-maximizing distributions that are consistent with specified expectations. We show how this theory recovers these measures of information and admits new forms that may not have been previously associated with entropic information, such as the log pointwise posterior predictive measure of model accuracy [11] . We also show how this theory admits novel information-optimizing probability distributions analogous to that of Jaynes'. Having a consistent interpretation of information illuminates how it may be applied and what properties will hold in a given context. This notion of evolving information is a natural consequence of the foundations reason in the Bayesian perspective that enables us to solve multiple challenges in Bayesian learning. One such challenge is understanding how efficiently a given model incorporates new data. This theory provides bounds on the information gained by a model resulting from inference and allows us to characterize the information contained in individual observations by evaluating their consistency with rational belief inferred from the entire dataset.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses notation and background regarding entropic information and Bayesian reasoning. Section 3 contains postulates that express properties of information we desire as well as the formulation of information that follows and other related measures of information. Section 4 analyzes general consequences and properties of this formulation. Section 5 examines connections with foundations of information theory. Section 6 discusses further implications with respect to Bayesian inference and machine learning. Section 7 explores negative information with computational experiments that illustrate when it occurs, how it may be understood, and why it is useful. Section 8 summarizes these results and offers a brief discussion of future work. Appendix A proves our principal result. Appendix B contains all corollary proofs. Appendix C provides key computations used in experiments.
Background and notation
Shannon's construction of entropy [1] shares a fundamental connection with thermodynamics. The motivation is to facilitate analysis of complex systems which can be decomposed into independent subsystems. The essential idea is simple -when probabilities multiply, entropy adds. This abstraction allows us to compose uncertainties across disparate sources by simply adding results.
Shannon applied this perspective to streams of symbols called channels. The number of possible outcomes grows exponentially with the length of a symbol sequence, whereas entropy grows linearly. This facilitates a rigorous formulation of the rate of information conveyed by a channel as well as analysis of what is possible in the presence of noise.
The property of independent additivity is used in standard training practices for machine learning. Just as thermodynamic systems and streams of symbols break apart, so does an ensemble of predictions over independent observations. This allows us to partition training sets into batches and compute cross-entropy averages. MacKay [12] gives a comprehensive discussion of information in the context of learning algorithms. Tishby [13] examines information trends during neural network training.
A second critical property of entropy, which is implied by Shannon and further articulated by both Barnard [14] and Rényi [15] , is that entropy is an expectation. Given a latent random variable z, we denote the probability distribution over outcomes as p(z). Stated as an expectation, entropy is defined as
Following Shannon, investigators developed a progression of divergence measures between general probability distributions, q 0 (z) and q 1 (z). Notable cases include the Kullback-Leibler divergence, Rényi's information of order-α [15] , and Csiszár's f -divergence [16] . We can also write the KL divergence as an expectation
Ebrahimi, Soofi, and Soyer [10] offer an examination of these axiomatic foundations and generalizations with a primary focus on entropy and the KL divergence.
Bayesian reasoning
The Bayesian view of probability, going back to Laplace [17] and championed by Jeffreys [18] and Jaynes [6] , focuses on capturing our beliefs. This perspective considers a probability distribution as an abstraction that attempts to model these beliefs. This view subsumes all potential sources of uncertainty and provides a comprehensive scope that facilitates analysis in diverse contexts.
Belief may express our understanding of what is consistent with physical models of natural laws. For example, the state of a particle in quantum theory is represented by a wave function, which transforms to probability distributions regarding position and momentum. Bell [19] shows that this form of uncertainty is physically intrinsic within the theory of quantum mechanics. Likewise, we model the evolution of uncertainty in thermodynamic systems as stochastic dynamical processes which capture fluctuations among compatible microstates [20] .
Uncertainty may also be purely epistemic, however. Laplace considers a card drawn from one of two urns, each containing a known ratio of black to white cards. A participant is given a card and is then asked to infer the plausibility of each urn. In this context, uncertainty exists strictly within the participant's mind.
In the Bayesian framework, the prior distribution p(z) expresses initial beliefs about some latent variable z. Statisticians, scientists, and engineers often have well-founded views about real-world systems that from the basis for priors. Examples include physically realistic ranges of model parameters or plausible responses of a dynamical system. In the case of total ignorance, one applies the principle of insufficient reason [21] -we should not break symmetries of belief without justification. Jaynes' construction of maximally uncertainty distributions [22] generalizes this principle, which we discuss further in 3.4 and 5.5.
As observations x become available, we update belief from the prior distribution to obtain the posterior distribution p(z | x), which incorporates this new knowledge. This update is achieved by applying Bayes' theorem
The likelihood distribution p(x | z) expresses the probability of observations given any specified value of z. The normalization constant p(x) is also the probability of x given the prior belief that has been specified. Within Bayesian inference, this is also called model evidence and it is used to evaluate a model structure's plausibility for generating the observations. Integrating the maturing notion of belief found within the Bayesian framework with information theory recognizes that our perception of how informative observations are depends on how our beliefs develop, which is dynamic as our state of knowledge grows.
Foundations of reason
Bernardo [23] shows that integrating entropy-like information measures with Bayesian inference provides a foundation for rational experimental design. He considers potential utility functions, or objectives for optimization, which are formulated as kernels of expectation over posterior belief updated by the outcome of an experiment. Bernardo then distinguishes the belief a scientist reports from belief that is justified by inference.
For a utility function to be proper, the Bayesian posterior must be the unique optimizer of expected utility over all potentially reported beliefs. In other words, a proper utility function must not provide an incentive to lie. His analysis shows that Lindley information
is a proper utility function. Thus entropy-based information measures are not simply ad hoc objectives -they are tied to foundations of reason by admitting optimization-based analysis that recovers rational belief.
Probability notation
Random variables are denoted in boldface such as x. Typically x and y will imply observable measurements and z will indicate either a latent explanatory variable or unknown observable. Each random variable is implicitly associated with a corresponding probability space including the set of all possible outcomes Ω z , a σ-algebra F z of measurable subsets, and a probability measure P z which maps subsets of events to probabilities. We then express the probability measure as a distribution function p(z).
A realization, or specific outcome, will be denoted with either a checkž or, for discrete distributions only, a subscript z i where i ∈ [n] and [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}. If it is necessary to emphasize the value of a distribution at a specific point or realization, we will use the notation p(z =ž). Conditional dependence is denoted in the usual fashion as p(z | x). The joint distribution is then p(x, z) = p(z | x)p(x) and marginalization is obtained by p(x) = dz p(x, z). When two distributions are equivalent over all subsets of nonzero measure, we use notation q 0 (z) ≡ p(z) or q 1 (z) ≡ p(z | x).
The probability measure allows us to compute expectations over functions f (z) which are denoted
Details regarding the support of integration or summation are left implicit unless stated. For example, in both the discrete case above and continuous cases, such as a distribution on the unit interval z ∈ R [0,1] , the integral notation should be interpreted respectively as
Sequences of belief
The postulates and theory in this work concern a sequence of beliefs beginning with an initial state q 0 (z) which is updated to a state q 1 (z). In general, any third state of belief r(z) may serve as the distribution over which expectation is taken. When we wish to emphasize this general perspective, we refer to this as the view of expectation. The support of r(z) refers to the set of outcomes for which r(z) > 0, which is also the support of expectation.
In the Bayesian context, we identify these distributions with prior belief q 0 (z) ≡ p(z) and the first posterior q 1 (z) ≡ p(z | x), which is conditioned upon an observation x. Then r(z) denotes the state of rational belief. Rational belief is logically consistent with the entire body of available evidence affecting the variable z. See 6.1 for further discussion. By denoting the partition of evidence that complements x as y, rational belief corresponds to a second inference r(z) ≡ p(z | x, y).
We will also denote realization using notation r(z |ž), which assigns all probability mass to the specified outcomež. In the continuous setting this corresponds to a Dirac delta distribution r(z |ž) ≡ δ(z −ž).
Information and evolution of belief
In order to provide context for comparison, we begin by presenting the properties of entropic information originally put forward by Shannon using our notation. 
The first point is aimed at extending Shannon's derivation, which employs rational probabilities, to real-valued probabilities. The second point drives at understanding entropy as a measure of uncertainty; as the number of possible outcomes increases, each realization becomes less predictable. This results in entropy taking positive values. The third point is critical -not only does it encode independent additivity, it implies that entropic information is computed as an expectation.
We note that Fadeeve [24] gives a simplified set of postulates. Rènyi [15] generalizes information by replacing the last point with a weaker version which simply requires independent additivity, but not conditional expectation. This results in α-divergences. Csiszàr [16] generalizes this further using convex functions f to obtain f -divergences.
Postulates
Rather than repeating direct analogs of Shannon's properties in the context of evolving belief, it is both simpler and more illuminating to be immediately forthcoming regarding the key requirement of information in the perspective of this theory. Postulate 1. Entropic information associated with the change in belief from q 0 (z) to q 1 (z) is quantified as an expectation over belief r(z), which we call the view of expectation. As an expectation, it must have the functional form
Postulate 2. Entropic information is additive over independent belief processes. Taking joint distributions associated with two independent random variables z and w to be q 0 (z, w) = q 0 (z)q 0 (w), q 1 (z, w) = q 1 (z)q 1 (w), and r(z, w) = r(z)r(w) gives 
The first postulate requires information to be reassessed as belief changes. The most justified state of belief, based on the entirety of observations, will correspond to the most justified view of information. By combining this with the second postulate, it is possible to show that f (r, q, p) = log r γ q α p β for constants α, β, γ. See A for details. The third postulate then constrains these exponential constants and the fourth simply sets the sign of information.
Principal result
Theorem 1. Information as a measure of change in belief. Information measurements that satisfy these postulates must take the form
Proof is given in A. As Shannon notes regarding entropy, α corresponds to a choice of units. Typical choices are natural units α = 1 and bits α = log(2) −1 . We employ natural units in analysis and bits in experiments.
Although it would be possible to combine Postulate 1 and Postulate 2 into an analog of Shannon's chain rule as a single postulate, doing so would obscure the reasoning behind the construction. We leave the analogous chain rule as a consequence in Corollary 1. Regarding Shannon's proof that entropy is the only construction that satisfies properties he provides, we observe that he has restricted attention to functionals acting upon a single distribution. The interpretation of entropy is discussed in 4.1.
Cox [5] discusses the properties of reasonable expectation and shows why r(z) must be understood as a proper (normalized) probability distribution. As for q 0 (z) and q 1 (z), however, nothing postulated prevents analysis respecting improper or non-normalizable probability distributions. In the Bayesian context, such distributions merely represent relative plausibility among subsets of outcomes. We caution that such analysis is a further abstraction, which requires some subtlety for interpretation.
We remark that although Rènyi and Csiszàr were able to generalize information by weakening Shannon's chain rule to independent additivity, inclusion of the first postulate prevents such generalizations.
Regarding the support of expectation
The proof given assumes q 0 (z) and q 1 (z) take positive values over the support of the integral, which is also the support of r(z). In the Bayesian context, we also have
Accordingly, if for somež we have q 1 (ž) = 0 it follows that r(ž) = 0. Likewise, q 0 (ž) = 0 would imply both q 1 (ž) = 0 and r(ž) = 0. This forbids information contributions that fall beyond the scope of the proof. Even so, the resulting form is analytic and admits analytic continuation.
Since both lim ε→0 [ε log ε] = 0 and lim ε→0 ε log ε −1 = 0, limits of information of the form
are consistent with restricting the domain of integration (or summation) to the support of r(z). We gain further insight by considering limits of the form lim ε→0 r log ε q and lim ε→0 r log q ε .
Information diverges to −∞ in the first case and +∞ in the second. This is consistent with the fact that no finite amount of data will recover belief over a subset that has been strictly forbidden from consideration, which bears ramifications for how we understand rational belief. If belief is not subject to influence from evidence, it is difficult to credibly construe an inferred outcome as having rationally accounted for that evidence. Lindley calls this Cromwell's rule [25] ; we should not eliminate a potential outcome from consideration unless it is logically false. The principle of insufficient reason goes further by avoiding unjustified creation of information that is not influenced by evidence.
Information density
The Radon-Nikodym theorem [26] formalizes the notion of density that relates two measures. If we assign both probability and a second measure to any subset within a probability space, then there exists a density function, unique up to subsets of measure zero, such that the second measure is equivalent to the integral of said density over any subset. Definition 1. Information density. We take the Radon-Nikodym derivative to obtain information density of the change in belief from q 0 (z) to q 1 (z)
The key property we find in this construction is independence from the view of expectation. As such, information density encodes all potential information outcomes one could obtain from this theory. Furthermore, this formulation is amenable to analysis of improper distributions. For example, it proves useful to consider information density corresponding to constant unit probability density q 1 (z) ≡ 1, which is discussed further in 4.1.
Information pseudometrics
The following pseudometrics admit interpretations as notions of distance between belief states that remain compatible with Postulate 1. This is achieved by simply taking the view of expectation r(z) to be the weight function in weighted-L p norms of information density. These constructions then satisfy useful properties of pseudometrics:
Definition 2. L p information pseudometrics. We may construct pseudometrics between states of belief q 0 (z) and q 1 (z) with the view of expectation r(z), by taking weighted-L p norms of information density where the view of expectation serves as the weight function
Symmetry is obvious from inspection and the other properties follow by construction as a seminorm. With regard to positivity, we observe that if q 0 (z) and q 1 (z) are measurably distinct over the support of r(z) then the measured distance must be greater than zero. We may regard states of belief q 0 (z) and q 1 (z) as weakly equivalent in the view of r(z) if their difference is immeasurable over the support of r(z). That is, if q 0 (z) and q 1 (z) only differ over subsets of outcomes that are deemed by r(z) to be beyond plausible consideration, then in the view of r(z) they are equivalent. As such, these pseudometrics could be regarded as subjective metrics in the view of r(z).
The homogeneity property of seminorms implies that these constructions retain the units of measure of information density; if information density is measured in bits, these distances have units of bits as well. Note that taking p = 1 results in a pseudometric that is also a pure expectation.
The natural definition of information variance also satisfies the properties of a pseudometric and is also interpretable as a standard statistical construct. Definition 3. Information variance. Information variance between belief states q 0 (z) and q 1 (z) in the view of expectation r(z) is simply the variance of information density
Corollaries and Interpretations
The following corollaries examine primary consequences of Theorem 1. Note that multiple random variables may be expressed as a single joint variable such as z = (z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z n ). The following corollaries explore one or two components at a time such as variables z 1 and z 2 or observations x and y. Extensions to multiple random variables easily follow.
Note that the standard formulation of conditional dependence holds in Corollary 1. That is, given any joint distribution q(z 1 , z 2 ), we can compute the marginalization q(z 1 ) ≡ dz 2 q(z 1 , z 2 ) and conditional dependence follows by the Radon-Nikodym derivative to obtain q(z 2 | z 1 ) ≡ q(z 1 ,z 2 ) q(z 1 ) . All proofs are contained in B.
Corollary 1. Chain rule of conditional dependence. Information associated with joint variables decomposes as
Corollary 2. Additivity over belief sequences. Information gained over a sequence of belief updates is additive within the same view. Given initial belief q 0 (z), intermediate states q 1 (z) and q 2 (z), and the view r(z) we have
Corollary 3. Antisymmetry. Information from q 1 (z) to q 0 (z) is the negative of information from q 0 (z) to q 1 (z)
Entropy
Shannon's formalization of entropy as uncertainty may be consistently understood as the expectation of information gained by realization. We first reconstruct information contained in realization. We then define the general form of entropy in the discrete case, which is cross entropy, and finally the standard form of entropy follows. 
Corollary 5. Cross entropy (discrete). Let z be a discrete random variable z ∈ {z i | i ∈ [n]} andž be a hypothetical realization. Expectation over the view r(ž) of information gained by realization from belief q(z) recovers cross entropy Shannon proved that this is the only construction as a functional acting on a single distribution q(z) that satisfies his properties. As mentioned earlier, the information notation I q(z) [ 1 q(z) ] requires some subtlety of interpretation. Probability density 1 over all possible outcomes z ∈ Ω z is not generally normalized. Although these formulas are convenient abstractions that result from formal derivations as expectations in the discrete case, nothing prevents us from applying them in continuous settings, which recovers the typical definitions in such cases.
We emphasize that this definition of entropy on the continuum is not consistent with taking the limit of a sequence of discrete distributions that converges in probability density to that of a continuous limiting distribution. The entropy of such a sequence diverges to infinity, which matches our intuition; the amount of data required to specify a continuous (real) random variable also diverges.
Potential information
We now consider expectations over hypothetical future observations w that would influence belief in z as a latent variable. Given belief p(z), the probability of an observation w is p(w) = dz p(w | z)p(z) as usual. 
Corollary 9. Realization limit. Let z be a latent variable andž be the limit of increasing observations to obtain arbitrary precision over plausible values of z. Information gained from q 0 (z) to q 1 (z) in the realization limit r(z |ž) is pointwise information density
Implications regarding foundations
As discussed in 2, Kullback and Leibler, Lindley, and Jaynes have been identified as contributing key insights to our understanding of entropic information. In our view, Bernardo's contribution also carries profound implications regarding the fundamental connection between information and reason. We review these contributions within the context of this theory and conclude this section with remarks on Fisher information.
Kullback-Leibler divergence
As discussed in 2.4, we regard q 0 (z) ≡ p(z) as the prior and q 1 (z) ≡ p(z | x) as the posterior conditioned on the observation of x in the Bayesian setting. Without any additional evidence, we must take r(z) ≡ p(z | x) to be rational belief. This implies that the Kullback-Liebler divergence is the rational measure of information gained by the observation of x. It bears repeating that once additional evidence y has been observed, this will no longer hold. In general, Theorem 1 gives the rational measure of information gained by the observation of x, where the view of expectation is taken to be updated rational belief r(z) ≡ p(z | x, y).
Lindley information
In the context of this theory, Lindley's measure is not the information gained by the experiment; it is simply the difference in uncertainty due to the experiment. This distinction is highlighted by the following thought experiment.
Suppose z describes the value of two lottery tickets. Comparing the first ticket with winning numbers is represented by x, which we will call the first experiment. Lindley proposed the following measure of information
If the odds of winning are 1 : 2 20 , or roughly one in a million, the uncertainty difference in reading a single ticket is always 2.04 × 10 −5 bits, regardless of the outcome. Realization information, however, is 1.38 × 10 −6 bits for a losing ticket (the predictable outcome) verses 20 bits for a winning ticket. In contrast, I p(z | x) [ p(z | x) p(z) ] recovers realization information gained by reading the first ticket.
Reading the second ticket y and updating information I p(z | x,y) [ p(z | x) p(z) ] also recovers realization information regardless of the outcome of the second ticket. This is because once the first random variable is realized, thus eliminating all but one possible outcome, belief in that outcome may no longer change.
Bernardo proper utility
As discussed in 2.2, Bernardo considers utility functions that are formulated as expectations over inferred belief. By distinguishing optimal belief that is potentially reported from belief inferred by the evidence, Bernardo identifies a proper utility function as an optimization objective for which both are equivalent. He then shows that Lindley information is proper. We would like to go a step further and show that when information from q 0 (z) to q 1 (z) is positive in the view of r(z), we may claim that q 1 (z) is closer to r(z) than q 0 (z). For this claim to be consistent, we must show that any perturbation that unambiguously drives belief q 1 (z) toward the view r(z) must also increase information. The complementary perturbation response with respect to q 0 (z) immediately follows by Corollary 3.
Corollary 11. Proper perturbation response. Let q 1 (z) be measurably distinct from the view r(z) and I r(z) [ q 1 (z) q 0 (z) ] be finite. Let the perturbation η(z) preserve normalization and drive belief toward r(z) on all measurable subsets. It follows
It bears repeating, by Corollary 8, that mutual information captures expected proper utility, which provides a basis for rational experimental design and feature selection.
Discrepancy functions
Ebrahimi, Soofi, and Soyer [10] discuss information discrepancy functions, which have two key properties. First, a discrepancy function is nonnegative D[ q 1 (z) q 0 (z) ] ≥ 0 with equality if and only if q 1 (z) ≡ q 0 (z). Second, if we hold q 0 (z) fixed then D[ q 1 (z) q 0 (z) ] is convex in q 1 (z).
One of the reasons information discrepancy functions are useful is that they serve to identify independence. Random variables x and z are independent if and only if p(x) ≡ p(x | z). Therefore, we have D[ p(x, z) p(x)p(z) ] ≥ 0 with equality if and only if x and z are independent, noting that p(x, z) ≡ p(x | z)p(z). This has implications regarding sensible generalizations of mutual information.
Theorem 1 does not satisfy information discrepancy properties unless the view of expectation is taken to be r(z) ≡ q 1 (z), which is the KL divergence. We note, however, that information pseudometrics and information variance given in 3.6 satisfy a weakened formulation. Specifically, L p r(z) [ q 1 (z) q 0 (z) ] ≥ 0 with equality if and only if q 0 (z) and q 1 (z) are weakly equivalent in the view of r(z). Likewise, these formulations are convex in information density D[ q 1 (z) q 0 (z) ].
Jaynes maximal uncertainty
Jaynes uses entropy to analytically construct probability distributions for which uncertainty is maximal while maintaining consistency with a specified set of expectations. This construction avoids unjustified creation of information and places the principle of insufficient reason into an analytic framework within which the notion of symmetry generalizes to informational symmetries conditioned upon observed expectations.
We review how Jaynes constructs the resulting distribution r * (z). Let such kernels of expectation be denoted f i (z) for i ∈ [n] and the observed expectations be E r(z)
The Lagrangian, which captures both the maximal uncertainty objective and the expectation constraints, is
where λ ∈ R n is the vector of Lagrange multipliers. This Lagrangian formulation satisfies the variational principle in both r(z) and λ. Variational analysis yields the optimizer
Information-critical distributions
Rather than maximizing entropy, we may minimize I r(z) [ r(z) q 0 (z) ] while maintaining consistency with specified expectations. Since the following corollary holds for general distributions q 0 (z), including the improper case q 0 (z) ≡ 1, this includes Jaynes' maximal uncertainty as a minimization of negative entropy.
Corollary 12. Minimal information.
Given kernels of expectation f i (z) and specified expectations E r(z) [ f i (z)] = ϕ i for i ∈ [n], the distribution r * (z) that satisfies these constraints while minimizing information I r(z) [ r(z) q 0 (z) ] is given by
for some λ ∈ R n .
Remarks on Fisher information
Fisher provides an analytic framework to assess the suitability of a pointwise latent description of a probability distribution [27] . As Kullback and Leibler note, the functional properties of information in Fisher's construction are quite different from Shannon's and thus we do not regard Fisher information as a form of entropic information. Fisher's construction, however, can be rederived and understood within this theory. He begins with the assumption that there is some latent realizationž for which p(x |ž) is an exact description of the true distribution of x. We can then define the Fisher score as the gradient of information from any independent prior belief q 0 (x) to a pointwise latent description p(x | z), in the view p(x |ž)
Note thatž is fixed by assumption, despite remaining unknown. By the variational principle, the score must vanish at the optimizer z * . By Corollary 10, the optimizer must be z * =ž. We can then assess the sensitivity of information to the parameter z at the optimizer z * by computing the Hessian. This recovers an equivalent construction of the Fisher matrix within this theory
The primary idea behind this construction is that high-curvature in z implies that a pointwise description is both suitable and a well-conditioned optimization problem.
Generalized Fisher matrix
We may eliminate the assumption of an exact pointwise description and generalize analogous formulations to arbitrary views of expectation. 
Again, a local optimizer z * must satisfy the variational principle and yield a score of zero. The generalized Fisher matrix would typically be evaluated at such an optimizer z * .
Information in inference and machine learning
We begin this section with a brief discussion of rational views that may be used to measure information.
Then we discuss the model information and predictive information provided by inference. Once we have defined these information measurements, we derive upper and lower bounds between them that we anticipate being useful for future work. Finally, we show how inference information may be constrained, which addresses some challenges in Bayesian inference.
Discussion of rational views
Given a state of prior belief, Bayesian inference assimilates evidence to update belief and obtain the posterior distribution. As described in 2.4, we regard this as rational belief as opposed to an arbitrary belief that may serve as the view of expectation. Within the Bayesian philosophy, however, we may disagree about whether information can only be measured with respect to rational belief. This disagreement corresponds to objective versus subjective views of Bayesian probability, see [6] for a discussion.
Within the objective view, one's beliefs must be consistent with the entirety of evidence and prior knowledge must be justified by sound principles of reason. Therefore, anyone with the same body of evidence must hold the same rational belief. In contrast, the subjective view holds that one's personal beliefs do not need justification and do not require consistency with others. Note, however, that the subjective view does not imply that all beliefs are equally valid. It simply allows validity to be derived from other notions of utility, such as computational feasibility, in addition to consistency with evidence and prior knowledge.
While Theorem 1 does not require adoption of either perspective, these philosophies do influence allowable views of expectation. The objective philosophy implies that an information measurement is justified to the same degree as the view of expectation that defines it, whereas the subjective philosophy admits information analysis with any view of expectation.
Machine learning information
Akaike [28] first introduced information-based complexity criteria as a strategy for model selection. These ideas were further developed by Schwarz, Burnham, and Gelman [11, 29, 30] . We anticipate these notions will prove useful in future work to both understand and control the problem of memorization in machine learning training. Accordingly, we discuss how this theory views model complexity and distinguishes formulations of predictive information and residual information.
In machine learning, observations correspond to matched pairs of inputs and labels Y = x (j) , y (j) j ∈ [T] . For each sample j of T training examples, we would like to map the input x (j) to an output label y (j) . Latent variables θ are unknown model parameters from a specified model family or computational structure. A model refers to a specific parameter state and the predictions that the model computes are p(y (j) | x (j) , θ). Since the definitions and derivations that follow hold with respect to either single cases or the entire training ensemble, we will use shorthand notation p(y | θ) to refer to both scenarios.
We denote the initial state of belief in model parameters as q 0 (θ) and updated belief during training as q i (θ) for i ∈ [n]. We can then compute predictions from any state of model belief by marginalization q i (y) ≡ dθ p(y | θ)q i (θ). Definition 6. Model information. Model information from initial belief q 0 (θ) to updated belief q i (θ) in the view of r(θ) is given by
When we compute information contained in training labels, the label data obviously provide the rational view. This is represented succinctly by r(y |y), which assigns full probability to specified outcomes. Again, if we need to be explicit then this could be written as r(y | x (j) , y (j) ) for each case in the training set.
Definition 7. Predictive label information. The realization of training labels is the rational view r(y |y) of label plausibility. We compute information from prior predictive belief q 0 (y) to predictive belief q i (y) in this view as
In the continuous setting, this formulation is closely related to log pointwise predictive density [11] . We can also define complementary label information that is not contained in the predictive model.
Definition 8. Residual label information (discrete). Residual information in the label realization view r(y |y)
is computed as I r(y |y) [ r(y |y) q i (y) ] .
Residual information is equivalent to cross-entropy if the labels are full realizations. We note, however, that if training labels are probabilistic and leave some uncertainty then replacing r(y |y) above with a general distribution r(y) would correctly calibrate residual information so that if predictions were to match label distributions then residual information would be zero. Just as the limiting form of entropy discussed in 4.1 diverges, so also does residual information diverge in the continuous setting.
As a consequence of Corollary 2, the sum of predictive label information and residual label information is always constant. This allows us to rigorously frame predictive label information as a fraction of the total information contained in training labels. Moreover, Corollary 11 assures us that model perturbations that drive predictive belief toward the label view must increase predictive information. This satisfies our initial incentive for this investigation.
There is a second type of predictive information we may rationally construct, however. Rather than considering predictive information with respect to specified label outcomes, we might be interested in the information we expect to obtain about new samples from the generative process. If we regard marginalized predictions q i (y) as our best approximation of this process, then we would simply measure change in predictive belief in this view. Definition 9. Predictive generative approximation. We may approximate the distribution of new outcomes from model belief q i (θ) using the predictive marginalization q i (y) ≡ dθ p(y | θ)q i (θ). If we hold this to be the rational view of new outcomes from the generative process, predictive information is
Inference information bounds
In Bayesian inference, we have prior belief in model parameters q 0 (θ) ≡ p(θ) and the posterior inferred from training data q 1 (θ) ≡ p(θ |y). The predictive marginalizations are called the prior predictive and posterior predictive distributions respectively p(y) ≡ dθ p(y | θ)p(θ) and p(y |y) ≡ dθ p(y | θ)p(θ |y).
We derive inference information bounds for Bayesian networks [31] . Let y, θ 1 , and θ 2 represent a directed graph of latent variables. In general, the joint distribution can always be written as p(y, θ 1 , θ 2 ) = p(θ 2 | θ 1 , y)p(θ 1 | y)p(y). The property of local conditionality means p(θ 2 | θ 1 ,y) ≡ p(θ 2 | θ 1 ). That is, belief dependence in θ 2 is totally determined by that of θ 1 just as belief in θ 1 is computed fromy. Corollary 13. Joint local inference information. Inference information in θ 1 gained by having observedy is equivalent to the inference information in both θ 1 and θ 2 .
Corollary 14.
Monotonically decreasing local inference information. Inference information in θ 2 gained by having observedy is bound above by inference information in θ 1 .
This shows that inference yields nonincreasing information as we compound inference on locally conditioned latent variables, which is relevant for sequential predictive computational models such as neural networks. We observe that the inference sequence from training datay to model parameters θ to new predictions y is also a locally conditioned sequence. If belief in a given latent variable is represented as a probability distribution, this places bounds on what transformations are compatible with the progression of information. 
Inference information constraints
Practitioners of Bayesian inference often struggle when faced with inference problems for models structures that are not well suited to the data. An under expressive model family is not capable of representing the process being modeled. As a consequence, the posterior collapses to a small set of outcomes that are least inconsistent with the evidence. In contrast, an over expressive model admits multiple sufficient explanations of the process.
Both model and predictive information measures offer means to understand and address these challenges. By constraining the information gained by inference, we may solve problems associated with model complexity. In this section, we discuss explicit and implicit approaches to enforcing such constraints.
Explicit information constraints
Our first approach to encode information constraints is to explicitly solve a distribution that satisfies expected information gained from the prior to the posterior. We examine how information-critical distributions can be constructed from arbitrary states of belief q i (θ) for i ∈ [n]. Again, we may obtain critical distributions with respect to uncertainty by simply setting q 0 (θ) ≡ 1. By applying this to inference, so that n = 1 and q 1 (θ) ≡ p(θ | y), we recover likelihood annealling as a means to control model information.
Corollary 16. Constrained information.
Given states of belief q i (θ) and information constraints I r(θ) [ q i (θ) q 0 (θ) ] = ϕ i for i ∈ [n], the distribution r * (θ) that satisfies these constraints while minimizing I r(θ) [ r(θ) q 0 (θ) ] has the form Note that the bounds in 6.3 still apply if we simply include λ as a fixed model parameter in the definition of the likelihood function so that p(y | θ) → p(y | θ, λ) ≡ p(y | θ) λ . This prevents the model from learning too much, which may be useful for under-expressive models or for smoothing out the posterior distribution to aid exploration during learning.
Implicit information constraints
Our second approach introduces hyper-parameters, λ and ψ, into the Bayesian inference problem, which allows us to define a prior on those hyper-parameters that implicitly encodes information constraints. This approach gives us a way to express how much we believe we can learn from the data and model that we have in hand. Doing so may prevent overconfidence when there are known modeling inadequacies or underconfidence from overly broad priors.
As above, λ parameters influence the likelihood and can be though of as controlling annealing or an embedded stochastic error model. The ψ parameters control the prior on the model parameters θ. For example, these parameters could be the prior mean and co-variance if we assume a Gaussian prior distribution. Therefore the inference problem takes the form p(θ, λ, ψ |y) = p(y | θ, λ)p(θ | ψ)p(λ, ψ) p(y) .
In order to encode the information constraints, we must construct the hyper-prior distribution p(λ, ψ) = g ϕ θ , ϕ y where control model information and predictive information, respectively. The function g ϕ θ , ϕ y is the likelihood of λ and ψ given the specified model and prediction complexities. For example, this could be an indicator function as to whether the information gains are within some range. Note that we may also consider other forms of predictive information such as the predictive generative approximation.
The posterior distribution on model parameters and posterior predictive distribution can be formed by marginalizing over hyper-parameters p(θ |y) = dλdψ p(θ, λ, ψ |y) and p(y |y) = dλdψ p(y | θ, λ)p(θ, λ, ψ |y).
Negative information
As mentioned in the introduction, information may be found to be negative under some circumstances.
The following experiments illustrate such cases and motivate the utility of negative information, which can be interpreted as identifying intermediate belief states that are later found to be less consistent with a more justified view than prior belief had been.
Negative information in continuous inference
In the following set of experiments we have a latent variable θ ∈ R 2 , which is distributed as N (θ | 0, I). Each sample y (j) ∈ R 2 corresponds to realization of an independent latent variable x (j) ∈ R 2 so that y (j) = θ + x (j) . Each x (j) is distributed as N (x (j) | 0, σ 2 1 I) where σ 1 = 1/2. Both prior belief in plausible values of θ and prior predictive belief in plausible values of y are visualized in Figure 1 . Deciles separate annuli of probability 1/10. The model information we expect to gain by observing 10 samples of y, which is also mutual information from Corollary 8, is I p(y,θ) [ p(y, θ) The first observation consists of 10 samples of y followed by inference of θ. Subsequent observations each add another 10, 20, and 40 samples respectively. A typical inference sequence is shown in Figure 2 . Model information gained by inference from the first observation in the same view is 5.72 bits. As additional observations become available the model information provided by first inference is eventually refined to 5.10 bits. Typically the region of plausible models θ resulting from each inference is consistent with what was previously considered plausible.
By running 1 million independent experiments, we construct a histogram of the model information provided by first inference in subsequent views. This is shown in Figure 3 . As a consequence of Postulate 4, the model information provided by first inference must always be positive before any additional observations are made. The change in model covariance in this experiment provides a stronger lower bound of 3.95 bits after first inference, which can be seen in the first view on the left. This bound is saturated in the limit when the inferred mean is unchanged. Additional observations may indicate that the first inference was less informative than initially believed. We may regard the rare cases showing negative information as being misinformed after first inference. The true value of the model θ may be known to arbitrary precision if we collect enough observations. This is the realization limit on the right. Under this experimental design, this limit converges to the Laplace distribution centered at mutual information L(µ, (log 2) −1 ) computed in the prior view.
From these million experiments, we can select the most unusual cases for which the information provided by first inference is later found to an extreme. Figure 4 visualizes the experiment for which the information provided by first inference is found to be the minimum after observing 160 total samples from the generative process. Although model information assessed following the first observation is a fairly typical value, additional samples quickly show that the first samples were unusual. This becomes highly apparent in the fourth view, which includes 80 samples in total. Figure 5 visualizes the complementary case in which we select the experiment for which the information provided by first inference is later found to be the maximum. The explantory characteristic of this experiment is the rare value that the true model has taken. High information in inference shows a high degree of surprise from what the prior distribution deemed plausible. Each inference indicates a range of plausible values of θ that is quite distant from the plausible region indicated by prior belief. The change in belief due to first inference is confirmed by additional data in fourth inference.
Finally, we examine a scenario in which the first 10 samples are generated from a different process than subsequent samples. We proceed with inference as before and assume a single generative process, despite the fact that this assumption is actually false. Figure 6 shows the resulting inference sequence. After first inference, nothing appears unusual because there is no data that would contradict inferred belief. As soon as additional data become available, however, information in first inference becomes conspicuously negative. Note that the one-in-a-million genuine experiment exhibiting minimum information, Figure 4 , gives −11.53 bits after 70 additional samples. In contrast, this experiment yields −47.91 bits after only 10 additional samples. Figure 6 . Inconsistent inference. The first 10 samples are drawn from a different ground truth than subsequent samples, but inference proceeds as usual. As additional data become available, first inference information becomes markedly negative.
By comparing this result to the information distribution in the realization limit, we see that the probability of a genuine experiment exhibiting information this negative would be less than 2 −155 . This shows how highly negative information may flag anomalous data. We explore this further in the next section.
Negative information in MNIST model with mislabeled data
We also explore predictive label information in machine learning models by constructing a small neural network to predict MNIST digits [32] . This model was trained with 50,000 images with genuine labels. Training was halted using cross-validation from 10,000 images that also had genuine labels. To investigate how predictive label information serves as an indicator of prediction accuracy, we randomly mislabeled a fraction of unseen cases. Prediction information was observed on 10,000 images for which 50% had been randomly relabeled, which resulted in 5,521 original labels and 4,479 mismatched labels.
The resulting distribution of information outcomes is plotted in Figure 7 , which shows a dramatic difference between genuine labels and mislabeled cases. In all cases, prediction information is quantified from the uninformed probabilities q 0 (y = y i ) = 1/10 for all outcomes i ∈ [10] to model predictions, which are conditioned on the image input q 1 (y | x), in the view of the label r(y | y i ). Total label information, the sum of predictive label information and residual label information, is I r(y | y i ) [ r(y | y i ) q 0 (y) ] = I r(y | y i ) [ q 1 (y | x) q 0 (y) ] + I r(y | y i ) [ r(y | y i ) q 1 (y | x) ] = log 2 (10) bits Figure 7 . Histogram of information outcomes for genuine labels (left) and mislabeled (right) cases. Correct label information is highly concentrated at 3.2 bits, which is 95.9% of the total information contained in labels. Mislabeled cases have mean information at -18 bits and information is negative for 99.15% of mislabeled cases. or roughly 3.32 bits for each case. Both Figure 8 and Figure 9 show different forms of anomaly detection using negative information. Figure 8 shows that genuine labels may exhibit negative information when predictions are poor. Only 1.1% of correct cases exhibit negative predictive label information. The distribution mean is 3.2 bits for this set. Notably, the first two images appear to be genuinely mislabeled in the original dataset, which underscores the ability of this technique to detect anomalies.
In contrast, over 99.1% of mislabeled cases exhibit negative information with the distribution mean at −18 bits. The top row of Figure 9 shows that information is most negative when the claimed label is not plausible and model predictions clearly match the image. Similarly to 7.1, strongly negative information indicates anomalous data. When incorrect predictions match incorrect labels, however, information can be positive as shown in the bottom row. The cases appear to share identifiable features with the claim.
Negative information indicates that the prediction is farther from the label view than uninformed predictions; we would be more likely to guess the claimed label without observing model predictions. We remark that the claimed label is assumed to be correct. Negative information strictly implies that the prediction is inconsistent with the view of expectation.
Conclusion
Just as belief matures with accumulation of evidence, we hold that the information associated with a shift in belief must also mature. By formulating principles that articulate how we may regard information as an expectation that measures change in belief, we derived a theory of information that places existing measures of entropic information in a coherent unified framework. These measures include Shannon's original description of entropy, cross-entropy, realization information, Kullback-Leibler divergence, and Lindley information (uncertainty difference) due to an experiment.
Moreover, we found other explainable information measures that may be adapted to specific scenarios from first principles including the log pointwise predictive measure of model accuracy. We derived useful properties of information including the chain rule of conditional dependence, additivity over belief updates, consistency with respect expected future observations, and expected information in future experiments as mutual information. We also showed how this theory generalizes information-critical probability distributions that are consistent with observed expectations analogous to that of Jaynes'. In the context of Bayesian inference, we showed how information constraints recover and illuminate useful annealed inference practices.
We also examined the phenomenon of negative information, which occurs when a more justified point of view, based on a broader body of evidence, indicates that a previous change of belief was misleading. Experiments demonstrated that negative information reveals anomalous cases of inference or anomalous predictions in the context of machine learning.
The primary value of this theoretical framework is the consistent interpretation and corresponding properties of information that guide how it may be assessed in a given context. The property of additivity over belief updates within the present view allows us to partition information in a logically consistent manner. For machine learning algorithms, we see that total information from the uninformed state to a label-informed state is a constant that may be partitioned into the predicted component and the residual component. This insight suggests new approaches to model training, which will be the subject of continuing research.
Future work
The challenges we seek to address with this theory relate to real-world applications of inference and machine learning. Although Bayesian inference provides a rigorous foundation for learning, poor choices of prior or likelihood can lead to results that elude or contradict human intuition when analyzed after the fact. This only becomes worse as the scale of learning problems increases, as in deep neural networks, where human intuition cannot catch inconsistencies. Information provides a metric to quantify how well a model is learning that may be useful when structuring learning problems. Some related challenges include: 1. Controlling model complexity in machine learning to avoid memorization, 2. Evaluating the influence of different experiments and data points to identify outliers or poorly supported inferences, 3. Understanding the impact of both model-structure and fidelity of variational approximations on learnability. By Lemma A2, we have f (r(z), q 1 (z), q 0 (z)) = log r(z) γ q 1 (z) α q 0 (z) β . From Postulate 3, we require dz r(z) log r(z) γ q 0 (z) α+β = γ dz r(z) log r(z) + (α + β) dz r(z) log q 0 (z) = 0.
Since this must hold for arbitrary r(z) and q 0 (z), this implies γ = 0 and β = −α. Thus we see that I r(z) [ r(z) q 0 (z) ] = αD KL [ r(z) q 0 (z) ], which is a constant α times the Kullback-Leibler divergence [2] .
Jensen's inequality easily shows nonnegativity of the form
It follows from Postulate 4 that α > 0. As Shannon notes, the scale is arbitrary and simply defines the unit of measure.
Appendix B. Corollary proofs
Proof of Corollary 1. We unpack Theorem 1 and write joint distributions as the marginalization times the corresponding conditional distribution such as r(z 1 , z 2 ) ≡ r(z 2 | z 1 )r(z 1 ). This gives
Proof of Corollary 2. Again, we simply unpack Theorem 1 and apply the product property of the logarithm as
Proof of Corollary 3. Swapping q 0 (z) and q 1 (z) reciprocates the argument of the logarithm in Theorem 1, which gives the negative of the original ordering. Proof of Corollary 9. The limit of increasing precision yields the Dirac delta function p(z |ž) ≡ δ(z −ž). It follows I p(z |ž) [ q 1 (z) q 0 (z) ] = dz δ(z −ž) log q 1 (z) q 0 (z) = log q 1 (z =ž) q 0 (z =ž) .
Proof of Corollary 10. We consider differential variations at the optimizer q 1 (z) = q * (z) + εη(z) where variations η(z) must maintain normalization dz η(z) = 0 and are otherwise arbitrary. Taking the Gâteaux derivative (with respect to the differential element ε) and applying the variational principle gives 0 = dz η(z) p(z | x) q * (z) .
To satisfy the normalization constraint for otherwise arbitrary η(z), the term in brackets must be constant. The stated result immediately follows.
Proof of Corollary 11. Let measurable disjoint subsets of outcomes be Ω > = {z | r(z) > q 1 (z) > 0} and Ω < = {z | r(z) < q 1 (z)}. If η(z) drives belief toward r(z) on all measurable subsets then η(z) ≥ 0 for z almost everywhere in Ω > . Likewise, η(z) ≤ 0 almost everywhere in Ω < . Finally, η(z) = 0 almost everywhere on the complement Ω z \ (Ω > ∪ Ω < ). In order to retain normalization, we note that dz η(z) = 0. If information is finite, then we may express r(z) = q 1 (z)(1 + δ(z)) almost everywhere (except an immeasurable subset that is not contained in Ω > ∪ Ω < for which we could have q 1 (z) = 0 and r(z) > 0) and observe that δ(z) > 0 for z ∈ Ω > just as δ(z) < 0 for z ∈ Ω < . Since η(z) has the same sign as δ(z) almost everywhere, it follows 
We consider differential variations at the optimizer r(z) = r * (z) + εη(z) where variations η(z) must maintain normalization dz η(z) = 0 and are otherwise arbitrary. Taking the Gâteaux derivative and applying the variational principle gives 0 = dz η(z) log r * (z) q 0 (z)
To satisfy the normalization constraint for otherwise arbitrary η(z), the variational principle requires the term in brackets to be constant. The stated result immediately follows.
Proof of Corollary 13. We unpack Theorem 1 and apply the local conditionality property to write p(θ 1 , θ 2 |y) ≡ p(θ 2 | θ 1 )p(θ 1 |y). This gives I p(θ 1 ,θ 2 |y) [ p(θ 1 , θ 2 |y) p(θ 1 , θ 2 ) ] = dθ 1 dθ 2 p(θ 1 , θ 2 |y) log p(θ 1 , θ 2 |y) p(θ 1 , θ 2 ) = dθ 2 p(θ 2 | θ 1 ) dθ 1 p(θ 1 |y) log p(θ 2 | θ 1 )p(θ 1 |y) p(θ 2 | θ 1 )p(θ 1 ) = dθ 1 p(θ 1 |y) log p(θ 1 |y) p(θ 1 ) = I p(θ 1 |y) [ p(θ 1 |y) p(θ 1 ) ] .
Proof of Corollary 14.
As a consequence of local conditional dependence, we observe that p(θ 2 |y) = dθ 1 p(θ 2 | θ 1 )p(θ 1 |y). Then we apply Jensen's inequality followed by Bayes' Theorem to obtain I p(θ 2 |y) [ p(θ 2 |y) p(θ 2 ) ] = dθ 2 dθ 1 p(θ 2 | θ 1 )p(θ 1 |y) log p(θ 2 |y) p(θ 2 ) ≤ dθ 1 p(θ 1 |y) log dθ 2 p(θ 2 | θ 1 ) p(θ 2 |y) p(θ 2 ) = dθ 1 p(θ 1 |y) log dθ 2 p(θ 1 | θ 2 )p(θ 2 |y) p(θ 1 ) = dθ 1 p(θ 1 |y) log p(θ 1 |y) p(θ 1 ) + log dθ 2 p(θ 1 | θ 2 )p(θ 2 |y) p(θ 1 |y) .
The first term provides the upper bound we seek. It remains to show that the second term is bound from above by zero, which follows from a second application of Jensen's inequality Proof of Corollary 15. The denominator of the first log argument is model evidence and we apply Bayes' Theorem to the second log argument. Denominators of log arguments cancel and Jensen's inequality implies that the first term must be greater than the second. Prior belief is p(θ) ≡ N (θ | 0, A) and p(x (j) ) ≡ N (x (j) | 0, Σ). Since y (j) = θ + x (j) , we have p(y (j) | θ) ≡ N (y (j) | θ, Σ). If we let n samples have an averageȳ, it easily follows that p(ȳ | θ) ≡ N (ȳ | θ, 1 n Σ). Bayes' rule gives p(θ |ȳ) ∝ p(ȳ | θ)p(θ) or
where B −1 = A −1 + nΣ −1 and µ = nBΣ −1ȳ . Normalization yields p(θ |ȳ) ≡ N (θ | µ, B).
